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Abstract 
While bystanders‘ outrage over moral transgressions may represent a genuine desire to 
restore justice, such expressions can also be self-serving—alleviating guilt and bolstering 
one‘s moral status. Four studies examined whether individual differences in observer justice 
sensitivity (JSO) moderate the degree to which outrage at third-party harm-doing reflects 
concerns about one‘s own moral identity rather than justice per se. Among participants low 
(vs. high) in JSO, feelings of guilt predicted greater outrage and desire to punish a 
corporation‘s sweatshop labor practices (Studies 1 & 2). Furthermore, affirming one‘s 
personal moral identity reduced outrage and support for punishing a corporate harm-doer 
among those low, but not high in JSO (Studies 3 & 4).  Similar moderation was absent for 
other forms of justice sensitivity and just world beliefs.  Effects were not explained by 
negative affect, empathy, personal harm, or political orientation.  Results suggest that JSO 
uniquely differentiates defensive and justice-driven moral outrage. (150/150). 
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Righteous or self-righteous anger? Justice sensitivity moderates defensive outrage at a third-
party harm-doer 
When an energy corporation used violent tactics against Native Americans protesting 
the construction of an oil pipeline on their sacred lands, people around the world took to 
social media to express their outrage (Levin & Woolf, 2016).  Such expressions of 
―righteous‖ or ―moral‖ outrage are generally seen as stemming from a fundamental 
motivation for justice based on genuine concern for those affected (Lerner 2003; Miller & 
Ratner, 1996; Montada, 1998).   
However, while bystanders‘ expressions of outrage may represent a genuine desire to 
restore justice or protect the victimized, recent research suggests that outrage can be self-
serving; alleviating guilt and bolstering perceptions of one‘s moral character (Jordan, 
Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016; Rothschild & Keefer, 2017; Rothschild et al. 2013).  This 
raises the possibility that bystander outrage may not necessarily be motivated by concerns 
with justice per se.  So how do we differentiate between expressions of outrage reflecting a 
genuine concern for justice and those driven by less altruistic concerns about personal moral 
status?  
One clue comes from research on individual differences in justice concern.  
Researchers have identified stable individual differences in people‘s awareness and reactivity 
to injustice (Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005).  Variation in justice sensitivity 
presumably reflects differences in concern for justice and motivation to see it carried out 
(Baumert, Rothmund, Thomas, Gollwitzer, & Schmitt, 2013).  The present research examines 
whether variation in justice sensitivity accounts for the differences between more justice-
oriented vs. egoistic forms of moral outrage.  We draw on recent research to examine whether 
dispositional differences in justice sensitivity can be used to differentiate those expressing 
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outrage out of a concern about their own moral identity from those doing so out of a concern 
for justice. 
Moral Outrage 
Moral outrage is anger elicited by the perception that someone has violated a moral 
principle, such as causing illegitimate harm (Batson et al., 2007).  Unlike other forms of 
anger (i.e., personal anger and empathic anger) moral outrage can be provoked when 
someone, other than oneself or a close other, is unjustly harmed by a third-party (Thomas et 
al., 2009).  Such outrage directed against a third-party perpetrator can motivate efforts to 
intervene on behalf of the victimized (Montada & Schneider, 1989; Thomas, 2005; Pagano & 
Huo, 2007).  Because outrage at third-party harm-doing seems to stem from a motive to 
protect victims of injustice, it is intuitive to interpret outrage as reflecting an underlying 
concern to see justice upheld.   
However, other research has shown that threats to one‘s moral identity moderate 
analogous expressions of third-party-directed outrage.  For example, when Dutch participants 
were told that their group's lack of support for immigrants threatened the group's moral (vs. 
non-moral) status, they subsequently expressed greater outrage toward German harm-doing 
and less outrage about their own group's behavior (Täuber & van Zomeren, 2013).  Similarly, 
when middle-class Americans were told that their group (vs. another cause) was primarily to 
blame for the suffering of the working-class, they showed greater outrage at working-class 
harm perpetrated by illegal immigrants and subsequent support for punishing illegal 
immigrants (Rothschild et al., 2013).   
Recently, Rothschild and Keefer (2017) conducted a series of studies suggesting that 
outrage at third-party harm-doers can be motivated by an underlying desire to alleviate guilt 
and restore a moral self-image following personal or ingroup immorality.  Initial studies 
found that guilt elicited by reminders of personal or ingroup culpability for labor exploitation 
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(Study 1) or environmental destruction (Study 2) predicted elevated outrage at a third-party 
harm-doer (multinational corporations).  They also found that the opportunity to express (vs. 
not express) third-party-directed outrage following reminders of ingroup transgressions 
reduced felt guilt (Study 2) and bolstered participants‘ ratings of their own moral character 
(Study 3).  In a final study, researchers manipulated whether participants were given an 
alternative means of bolstering their moral identity prior to expressing outrage.  They found 
that initially high guilt over the ingroup‘s impact on sweatshop workers predicted elevated 
outrage at an exploitative corporation, unless participants were given the opportunity to write 
about what made them a good person.  In other words, affirming one‘s personal moral 
identity attenuated participants guilt-induced feelings of outrage at a third-party harm-doer.   
Taken together, these studies provide strong evidence that outrage can be driven by 
feelings of guilt and grounded in concerns with maintaining one‘s own moral identity rather 
than merely a concern for protecting the victimized or promoting justice. 
Of course, just because expressions of outrage can be defensive does not mean that all 
of those voicing outrage at injustice are merely insecure.  However the aforementioned 
research offers limited insight into whose outrage is likely to stem from a more or less 
egoistic motive.  The current studies address this gap by testing whether justice sensitivity 
shapes outrage in reaction to perceived injustice. 
Justice Sensitivity 
As noted, justice sensitivity is a stable and generalizable individual difference in 
peoples' readiness to perceive and react to injustice (Baumert & Schmitt, 2016) that 
ostensibly reflects differential concern for justice (Baumert et al., 2013).  Researchers further 
differentiate between one‘s sensitivity to being a victim, an outside observer, a passive 
beneficiary, or a perpetrator of injustice.  Empirical evidence confirms that these four 
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assumed perspectives of justice sensitivity are distinguishable and are reliably assessed with 
separate scales (Schmitt et al., 2005, 2010).   
We focus on research examining justice sensitivity from an observer perspective 
given our interest in outrage over third-party harm-doing.  The observer sensitivity scale 
(Schmitt et al., 2010) assesses the extent to which people are aware of and upset by the 
perception of injustice perpetrated and experienced by others.  Research using this measure 
finds that justice sensitivity is an important predictor of cognitive, affective, and behavioral 
responses to justice violations.  For instance, individuals high in observer sensitivity show 
more attentiveness to injustice-related words, particularly after exposure to a perpetrated 
injustice (Baumert, Gollwitzer, Staubach, & Schmitt, 2011).  Research also shows that 
individuals high in observer sensitivity are more likely to adopt egalitarian decision rules 
when playing economic games.  This includes rejecting and punishing a third-party who 
treats another player unfairly, even when it bears a financial cost to oneself (Fetchenhauer & 
Huang, 2004; Lotz, Baumert, Schlosser, Gresser, & Fetchenhauer, 2011).   
Lotz and colleagues (2011) found justice-sensitive participants‘ pursuit of so-called 
altruistic punishment of third-party perpetrators was mediated by feelings of moral outrage.  
Specifically, elevated feelings of outrage at a third-party‘s unfair allocation of funds to 
another player led high observer-sensitive participants to punish the offender despite the cost.  
Similarly, Rothmund, Baumert, and Zinkernagel (2014) found that moral outrage predicted 
greater bystander support for political protest among observer sensitive participants. 
Evidence shows that bystanders high in observer sensitivity display stronger 
emotional and behavioral reactions to another‘s experience of unfairness.  According to 
Baumert and colleagues (2013) this pattern is consistent with the notion that justice 
sensitivity reflects an individual‘s genuine concern for justice and motivation to see justice 
upheld without regard for egoistic concerns.      
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The Current Studies 
Recent research shows that bystanders‘ expressions of outrage at another party‘s 
injustice does not always reflect a pure concern with justice.  This research raises an 
important distinction:  For some, outrage may reflect a commitment to justice; yet for others, 
outrage may serve as a palliative response to guilt and an underlying concern with 
maintaining a moral self-image.  How then are we to predict who will express defensive as 
opposed to genuine outrage?  
 Across four studies, we test a model that uses justice sensitivity to disentangle the 
motives behind moral outrage against exploitative corporate labor practices.  Based on the 
premise the justice sensitivity reflects genuine concern for justice, the outrage expressed by 
highly justice-sensitive observers is unlikely to vary based on personal moral status.  In 
contrast, individuals low in justice sensitivity may express outrage more strategically to 
manage moral status concerns.  Accordingly, we predict that justice sensitivity will moderate 
the relations between moral status and outrage:  
H1: Among participants low (vs. high) in observer justice sensitivity, outrage will be 
higher to the extent that individuals feel guilty (Studies 1 & 2) or otherwise lack an 
alternative means of affirming of their personal moral identity (Studies 3 & 4). 
Furthermore, we anticipate that this predicted moderating effect of observer sensitivity will 
be specific to this dimension, which reflects concern over third-party harm-doing.  Put 
formally, we predict that: 
H2: We will find the moderation specified in H1 for observer, but not perpetrator or 
beneficiary sensitivity (Study 2), victim sensitivity (Study 3), or just world beliefs 
(Study 4). 
We also test these hypotheses with an eye toward key alternatives, including the possibility 
that outrage is a function of empathy or negative affect generally (Study 1), perceived 
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personal harm (Study 3), or political orientation (Study 4).  We expect that the predicted 
patterns of outrage dependent on observer justice sensitivity would remain even after 
accounting for these variables. 
Study 1 
 Study 1 had two goals.  First, we sought to replicate research showing that guilt over 
one‘s own contributions to sweatshop labor predicts greater outrage at a corporation‘s labor 
exploitation (Rothschild & Keefer, 2017).  Following previous research (and employing the 
same materials), we wanted to show that this relationship was not explained by variations in 
general negative affect or empathy for the victims.  This is important given the hypothesized 
unique role of guilt and the need to differentiate moral outrage from empathic anger (see 
Batson, 2011).  We did this by statistically controlling for general negative affect and the 
extent to which participants empathized with the victimized workers.  Second, and most 
importantly, we wanted to provide an initial test of the proposed moderating role of observer 
justice sensitivity.  We predicted that feelings of personal guilt would be especially likely to 
predict moral outrage for those low (vs. high) in observer sensitivity.    
Method 
One-hundred and fifty American adults were recruited to participate through 
Amazon‘s Mechanical Turk (Mturk) service for $.60. 1 Data from 15 cases was excluded 
from analyses due to failing an attention check (12 participants), and/or spending less than 10 
seconds viewing the article on sweatshop labor (6 participants; 3 also failed the attention 
check).  The remaining 135 participants (74 women, 60 men, 1 unidentified) ranged in age 
from 18 to 69 years (M = 31.10, SD = 9.55).   
All of our studies were described to participants as an examination of personality and 
attitudes about issues in the news that involved reading short news excerpts and completing 
questionnaires.  Additionally, all studies reminded participants of their right to voluntarily 
withdraw from the study at any time they wished. Data were anonymized to prevent any risk 
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to participants and all participants who completed each study were provided with a full 
debriefing explaining the purpose of the study. Study 1 employed a correlational design.  All 
participants were exposed to the same materials described below in the order presented. 
2
   
Materials and Procedure 
 
 Observer justice sensitivity. Participants first completed the 10-item observer justice 
sensitivity scale (JSO) designed to assess individual differences in how people respond to 
―noticing or learning that someone else has been treated unfairly, put at a disadvantage or, 
used‖ (Schmitt, Gollwitzer, & Arbach, 2003).  Specifically, participants indicated whether 
they were upset by situations in which others received undue harm or reward (e.g., ―It bothers 
me when someone gets something they don‘t deserve‖; ―I am upset when someone is treated 
worse than others‖).  Responses were made on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree) and were averaged to form composite scores (M = 4.36, SD = .67; α = .81). 
Personal culpability induction.  Participants then read a fabricated news article used 
in previous research (Rothschild & Keefer, 2017).  The article, entitled ―The Exploitation of 
Workers: A Blight on the Developing World‖ discussed the ―subhuman working conditions‖ 
across the developing world, including an ―estimated 3 billion people and 250 million 
children working in so-called sweatshops, characterized by forced labor, substandard pay and 
hazardous working conditions‖.  The article accented the suffering of sweatshop workers by 
detailed examples of harmful sweatshop labor practices.  Participants then rated the extent to 
which they believed ―workers in developing countries were suffering as a result of sweatshop 
labor conditions‖ (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).  A one-sampled t test revealed that 
responses (M = 6.36, SD = .97) were significantly higher than scale‘s midpoint (4), t(134) = 
28.40, p  < .001, indicating a general acknowledgment that sweatshop workers experience 
considerable harm.  
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Participants were then asked to indicate the extent to which they personally engage in 
five behaviors purported to ―directly or indirectly contribute to the perpetuation of 
sweatshops and forced child labor in the developing world.‖ In an effort to highlight 
participants‘ own culpability, we intentionally selected five behaviors assumed to be common 
for participants in our sample (e.g., ―I sometimes buy products without knowing where they 
were made.‖; ―I rarely ask about working conditions when making a purchase‖).  Responses 
were made on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all true for me, 7 = very true for me).  Supporting 
our assumption that the items referred to common behaviors, a one-sample t test revealed that 
composite scores (M = 4.28, SD = .91; α = .91) were significantly higher than the midpoint 
(4), t(134) = 3.53, p = .001.   
Guilt.  Participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), a common measure of mood.  Participants indicated the 
degree to which they were currently experiencing 10 positive emotions (M = 2.13, SD = .63; 
α = .84) and 10 negative emotions (M = 1.90, SD = .59; α = .86) using a 5-point scale (1 = 
very slightly or not at all, 5 = extremely).  Of particular interest for the current study, 
participants indicated the extent to which they felt ―Guilty‖.  Responses to this item 
comprised our measure of personal guilt (M = 2.87, SD = 1.17).  The composite of the nine 
remaining negative affect items (M = 1.79, SD = .66) allowed us to test the specific role of 
guilt. 
Exposure to third-party harm-doing.  Participants then read an ostensible news 
article titled ―Apple‘s Factories Still ‗Sweatshops‘ says Watchdog Group‖ (also validated in 
past research; Rothschild & Keefer, 2017).  The article described exploitative labor practices 
uncovered at Apple Inc.‘s Chinese factories which included ―denying workers‘ basic human 
needs, such as allowing bathroom breaks, sufficient rest, and access to proper nutrition.‖  The 
article went out of its way to blame Apple, stating ―despite being aware of a multitude of 
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labor abuses in these factories, Apple Inc. failed to take action to stop these violations.  As 
such they bear the responsibility for the suffering of thousands of workers.‖ This article 
unambiguously presented Apple as a target third-party perpetrator exploiting laborers in the 
developing world.    
Empathy.  Participants completed a 7-item scale used in previous research (e.g., 
Pagano & Huo, 2007) to assess the extent to which participants felt empathy, sympathy, 
compassion, softhearted, tenderness, and warmth for workers suffering in Apple‘s Chinese 
factories and were moved by their plight.   Responses were made on a 7-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) and were averaged (M = 5.42, SD = 1.13; α = .94).    
Moral outrage.  Finally participants completed a 6-item moral outrage measure used 
in previous research (Rothschild & Keefer, 2017; Rothschild et al., 2013) to assess anger at a 
third party for perpetrating harm against a victimized outgroup.  Specifically, participants 
indicated the degree to which they felt anger at Apple for the harm caused by their 
exploitative labor practices (e.g., ―Thinking about the situation the workers in Apple‘s 
Chinese factories have endured due to Apple‘s abusive labor practices makes me angry on 
their behalf‖; ―Knowing that Chinese workers are probably helpless against Apple‘s abusive 
labor practices makes me angry on their behalf‖).  Responses were made on a 7-point scale (1 
= not at all, 7 = extremely) and were averaged (M = 5.32, SD = 1.53; α = .98). 
Results 
 Zero-order correlations for all variables are presented in Table 1. 
Moral Outrage 
We regressed moral outrage on observer justice sensitivity and personal guilt (both 
continuous and centered) and their predicted interaction.  We included general negative affect 
(excluding guilt) and empathy as additional covariates.  Together these predictors accounted 
for a significant amount of variance in moral outrage, R
2
adj = .68, F(5, 129) = 59.07, p < .001 
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(see Table 2 for models with and without covariates).  Importantly, the main effect of JSO on 
outrage was qualified by the predicted JSO × Guilt interaction, which accounted for a 
significant increase in R
2
, ΔR2 = .02, F(1, 129) = 9.87, p = .002 (Figure 1).   
Consistent with predictions, a simple slopes analysis revealed that whereas guilt 
predicted greater outrage at corporate harm-doing among those lower (-1 SD) in JSO, β = .23, 
b = .31, SE = .10, t = 3.01, p = 003, expressions of outrage among those high (+1 SD) in JSO 
were unrelated to guilt, β = -.07, b = -.09, SE = .11, t = -0.81, p = .42.  Put differently, 
whereas JSO predicted more outrage when personal guilt was low (-1 SD), β = .37, b = .85, 
SE = .17, t = 4.94, p < .001, JSO was not a significant predictor of outrage at high (+1 SD) 
guilt, β = .07, b = .16, SE = .17, t = 0.93, p = .35. 
Study 1 Discussion 
Results of Study 1 show that guilt predicted increased outrage at a third-party harm-
doer among those low, but not high, in observer justice sensitivity.  These findings replicate 
previous research on the relationship between guilt and outrage and support our current 
hypothesis that individual differences in justice sensitivity moderate this relationship.  
Specifically, the pattern of results is consistent with our prediction that defensive or self-
serving outrage is more common at low observer sensitivity.     
Results of Study 1 also show that justice sensitivity predicted outrage among those 
low, but not high, in guilt.  While the results among low guilt participants are consistent with 
previous research showing a positive relationship between justice sensitivity and outrage, 
these findings further suggest that observer justice sensitivity alone is not always a reliable 
predictor of outrage. Situational factors (e.g., personal guilt) seem capable of overriding the 
relevance of these dispositions. 
 These primary findings held when controlling for general negative affect and empathy 
for those affected. These results replicate previous research (Rothschild & Keefer, 2017; 
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Rothschild et al., 2013) and undercut alternative interpretations of the findings.  The finding 
that guilt plays a unique role in driving outrage, at least at low observer justice sensitivity, 
further demonstrates the importance of the moral aspect of guilt (rather than merely general 
negative affect) and controlling for empathy allowed us to address the possibility that 
participants‘ expressions of anger reflected empathic anger (Hoffman, 2000) rather than 
moral outrage. The fact that the primary interaction was unchanged by the inclusion of 
empathy is particularly important given the notable correlations between empathy and our 
other variables of interest.  
Although the results of Study 1 were consistent with our predictions, the study has 
some limitations.  First, a post-hoc power analysis revealed the study‘s test of the primary 
interaction to be underpowered (observed power = .46).  Thus, any conclusions should be 
tempered by the potential that the obtained effects may not be reliable.  Second, while the use 
of the PANAS allowed us to differentiate between general negative affect and personal guilt, 
the use of a single item measure of guilt is weak.  Third, Study 1 did not assess justice 
sensitivity from other perspectives.  Given the high correlations between observer, 
perpetrator, and beneficiary sensitivities (Schmitt et al., 2010), this leaves open the possibility 
that the obtained effects may not be specific to observer sensitivity.   
Study 2 
The primary goal of Study 2 was to replicate Study 1 with a larger sample to provide 
a more reliable test of the predicted effect.  We also replaced the incidental single-item 
assessment of guilt used in Study 1 with a validated three item measure assessing guilt in the 
specific context of sweatshop labor.   
In addition to assessing observer sensitivity, Study 2 also included the perpetrator and 
beneficiary justice sensitivity scales.  Given that our outcome of interest targeted responses to 
third-party harm-doing, we predicted that justice sensitivity‘s moderating effect on the role of 
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guilt would be specific to observer sensitivity.  Finally, we also tested whether the 
hypothesized effects on moral outrage elicited support for punitive action against a third-
party harm-doer, an outcome commonly associated with outrage (Pagano & Huo, 2007).              
Method 
Two-hundred and seventy-four American adults were recruited to participate through 
Mturk for $.60.
3
  Data from 31 cases was excluded from analyses for failing an attention 
check (25 participants), and/or spending less than 10 seconds viewing the article on 
sweatshop labor (6 participants).  The remaining 243 participants (159 women, 85 men, 3 
unidentified) ranged in age from 19 to 73 years (M = 32.94, SD = 10.65).  Excluding 4 non-
responses, over 66% of the remaining participants (159) reported owning an Apple product. 
4
  
Study 2 employed the same basic procedure as Study 1 with the addition of two additional 
justice sensitivity subscales, a more reliable and targeted measure of personal guilt, and a 
measure of support for third-party punishment. 
Materials and Procedure 
Observer justice sensitivity.  Participants completed the same 10-item JSO scale used 
in Study 1 (M = 4.09, SD = .74; α = .84). 
Perpetrator justice sensitivity.  Participants also completed the 10-item perpetrator 
justice sensitivity (JSP) scale (M = 4.93, SD = .90; α = .93) designed to assess individual 
differences in how people feel when they ―treat someone else unfairly” (Schmitt et al., 2010).  
Specifically, participants indicated whether they were upset by situations in which they 
mistreat, discriminate or use another person (e.g., ―It gets me down when I take something 
from someone else that I don‘t deserve‖ ; ―I feel guilty when I treat someone worse than 
others‖). 
Beneficiary justice sensitivity.  Then participants completed the 10-item beneficiary 
justice sensitivity (JSB) scale (M = 3.94, SD = .94; α = .91) designed to assess individual 
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differences in how people feel when their advantages come at the disadvantage of others 
(Schmitt et al., 2005).  Specifically, participants indicated whether they were upset by 
situations in which they receive an unfair benefit (e.g., ―It disturbs me when I receive what 
others ought to have‖ ; ―I feel guilty when I receive better treatment than others‖).   
Personal culpability induction.  Participants then read the same fabricated news 
article about labor exploitation used in Study 1 and rated the extent to which they believed 
―workers in developing countries were suffering as a result of sweatshop labor conditions‖.  
A one sampled t-test revealed that participants‘ responses (M = 6.45, SD = .87) were 
significantly higher than scale‘s midpoint (4), t(242) = 44.06, p < .001, indicating a general 
acknowledgment that sweatshop workers experience harm.  Participants also completed the 
behavioral survey used in Study 1.  As in Study 1 a one sample t-test revealed that responses 
(M = 4.27, SD = .86) were significantly higher than scale‘s midpoint (4), t(242) = 4.81, p < 
.001, indicating a general tendency to engage in behaviors contributing to labor exploitation. 
Guilt.  Participants then completed a modified 3-item guilt measure used in previous 
research to assess guilt over a given outcome (Rothschild & Keefer, 2017).  Specifically, 
participants indicated the extent to which they felt guilty, regretful, and apologetic for ―the 
negative impact my lifestyle has on sweatshop workers‖.  Responses (1 = strongly disagree, 7 
= strongly agree) formed a composite measure of personal guilt (M = 5.12, SD = 1.62; α = 
.92).   
Moral outrage.  Participants then read about Apple‘s exploitation of Chinese 
workers, and indicated the degree to which they felt anger at Apple‘s sweatshop labor 
practices using the same 6-item measure of moral outrage used in Study 1 (M = 5.36, SD = 
1.63; α = .98). 
Support for retributive punishment.  Participants also completed a modified 
retributive punishment scale used by previous research to assess individuals‘ desire to punish 
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a third-party perpetrator for harming a victimized outgroup (Pagano & Huo, 2007; Rothschild 
& Keefer, 2017).  Specifically, participants indicated whether they supported efforts to 
punish Apple for the harm perpetrated against sweatshop workers in the developing world 
(e.g., ―The United States should use whatever resources are available to prosecute 
corporations like Apple Inc. that are harming workers in developing countries‖; ―Whatever 
the cost, corporations like Apple Inc. must be brought to justice for unjustly hurting workers 
in developing countries‖).  Responses for all five items were made on a 7-point scale (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) and were averaged to form composite scores (M = 
5.50, SD = 1.56; α = .97).   
Results 
 Zero-order correlations for all variables are presented in Table 3. 
Moral Outrage 
We regressed moral outrage on observer, perpetrator, and beneficiary justice 
sensitivity scores, along with personal guilt (all continuous and centered), and interactions 
between each justice sensitivity type and guilt (JSO × guilt, JSP × guilt, JSB × guilt).  Together 
these predictors accounted for a significant variance in outrage, R
2
adj = .46, F(7, 235) = 30.27, 
p < .001 (see Table 4).  Importantly, although all three justice sensitivity scores predicted 
moral outrage, only the effect of observer sensitivity was qualified by the predicted JSO × 
Guilt interaction, which by itself accounted for a significant increase in R
2
,  ΔR2 = .015, F(1, 
235) = 6.75, p = .01 (Figure 2).   
 Simple slopes analysis revealed that guilt predicted greater outrage at corporate harm-
doing among those lower (-1 SD) in JSO, β = .65 b = .66, SE = .08, t = 8.06, p < 001.  To a 
lesser degree, felt guilt also predicted outrage among those high (+1 SD) in JSO, β = .30, b = 
.30, SE = .10, t = 3.14, p = .002.  Put differently, whereas JSO predicted greater outrage at low 
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(-1 SD) guilt, β = .40, b = .87, SE = .21, t = 4.16, p < .001, JSO was not a significant predictor 
of outrage at high (+1 SD) guilt, β = .04, b = .09, SE = .20, t = 0.47, p = .64. 
Retributive Punishment 
We regressed support for retributive punishment onto the same predictors.  This 
model accounted for significant variance in support for retributive punishment, adjusted R
2
 = 
.34, F(7, 235) = 18.73, p < .001 (see Table 5).  Importantly, whereas both perpetrator and 
observer sensitivity were significant predictors of retributive punishment, only the effect of 
observer sensitivity was qualified by the predicted JSO × Guilt interaction, which by itself 
accounted for a significant increase in R
2
,  ΔR2 = .02, F(1, 235) = 7.56, p < .007 (Figure 3).   
Consistent with predictions a simple slopes analysis revealed that whereas guilt 
predicted increased support for punishing corporate harm-doing among those lower (-1 SD) 
in JSO, β = .60, b = .58, SE = .09, t = 6.69, p < 001, the association between guilt and 
retributive punishment did not reach statistical significance among those high (+1 SD) in JSO, 
β = .19, b = .18, SE = .10, t = 1.76, p = .08.   JSO predicted greater support for retributive 
punishment at low (-1 SD) guilt, β = .47, b = .99, SE = .22, t = 4.44, p < .001, but this 
association was eliminated at high (+1 SD) levels of guilt, β = .05, b = .11, SE = .21, t = 0.54, 
p = .59. 
Study 2 Discussion 
As in Study 1, Study 2 revealed a significant interaction between guilt and observer 
justice sensitivity on outrage at a third-party harm-doer.  In line with our first broad 
hypothesis, guilt was a stronger predictor of outrage among those low (vs. high) in observer 
justice sensitivity.  This was also true concerning support for punishing a corporate 
wrongdoer.  Furthermore, while perpetrator sensitivity was positively associated with both 
outrage and retributive punishment, and beneficiary sensitivity was negatively associated 
with outrage, these effects were not qualified by guilt.  This shows that observer justice 
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sensitivity uniquely moderated the relationship between guilt and third-party-directed 
outrage.   
Unlike Study 1, Study 2 did find a significant effect of guilt on outrage at high JSO.  
This discrepancy may have been due to any number of factors, including Study 2‘s use of a 
larger sample size and a domain specific assessment of guilt.  While still consistent with the 
proposed moderating effect of justice sensitivity, this suggests that the outrage expressed by 
high (vs. low) observer-sensitive persons was at least less dependent, but not wholly 
independent, of felt guilt. 
  Importantly, although Studies 1 and 2 provide converging evidence that observer 
justice sensitivity moderates defensive or guilt-driven outrage, our conclusions are limited by 
the correlational nature of this research.   
Study 3 
Study 3 employed an experimental design to test whether justice sensitivity 
moderated the extent to which expressions of third-party-directed outrage reflect concerns 
about one‘s own moral identity.  Adopting a paradigm used in past research (Rothschild & 
Keefer, 2017; Rothschild et al., 2012) participants were randomly assigned to a writing task 
that either allowed them to affirm their own moral status or not, prior to reporting their 
outrage at third-party corporate harm-doer.  To the extent that outrage is expressed to 
maintain a moral identity, the opportunity to bolster one‘s moral status by other means would 
be expected to reduce expressions of outrage.  Consistent with this premise, Rothschild and 
Keefer (2017; Study 5) found that a moral status affirmation attenuated guilt-driven outrage 
at a third-party harm-doer.  If low (vs. high) observer-sensitive persons are more likely to 
express defensive outrage we would expect a moral identity affirmation to have a greater 
outrage-attenuation effect among those low (vs. high) in observer sensitivity.   
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Given the context of the present research, it is not unreasonable that participants could 
feel personally harmed by corporate practices that make them an unwitting accomplice.  This 
creates the possibility that anger at a corporation‘s harm-doing may reflect feelings of 
personal anger, or anger at one‘s own perceived victimization, rather than moral outrage at 
the injustice suffered by others (Thomas et al., 2009).  Study 3 was tested this possibility in 
two ways.  First, in line with previous research, we measured and statistically controlled for 
the extent to which participants felt that they were negatively affected by corporations‘ 
sweatshop labor practices.  Second, Study 3 included the victim justice sensitivity scale, 
which primarily assesses a concern for one‘s own fair treatment rather than a concern with 
justice (Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005; Schmitt et al., 2005).  Assuming 
that we are assessing moral outrage rather than personal anger and that victim-sensitivity 
(unlike observer-sensitivity) does not reflect a genuine concern for others, we would not 
expect it to be a unique predictor of outrage or a moderator of the affirmation manipulation.   
Method 
One-hundred and ninety-nine students at a small liberal arts college participated in the 
study in exchange for course credit. 
5
  Data from 37 cases were excluded from analyses based 
on a priori criteria used in our previous studies: failing an attention check (30 participants), 
and/or spending less than 10 seconds viewing the article on sweatshop labor (7 participants).  
One additional case was removed for being an extreme outlier, spending an excessive period 
of time (56 min) on the affirmation task (M = 2.43 min, SD = 1.97 min).  The remaining 161 
participants (98 women, 62 men, 1 unidentified) ranged in age from 18 to 22 years (M = 
18.58, SD = .78).  Over 96% of the sample (155) reported owning a product made by Apple 
Inc.  
Materials and Procedure 
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Observer justice sensitivity.  Participants completed the same 10-item JSO scale used 
in Study 1 (M = 4.41, SD = .61; α = .81). 
Victim justice sensitivity.  Participants also completed the 10-item victim justice 
sensitivity  (JSV) scale designed to assess individual differences in how people respond to 
situations in which they are the victims of unfair treatment (Schmitt et al., 2005).  
Specifically, participants indicated whether they were upset by situations in which they 
received undue or unequal harm or reward (e.g., ―It bothers me when others receive 
something which ought to be mine‖; ―It makes me angry when others receive a reward that I 
have earned‖).  Responses were made on the same 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree) and were averaged (M = 4.07, SD = .71; α = .83). 
Personal culpability induction.  Next participants were exposed to the same article 
used in Study 1, which highlighted the harmful effects of sweatshop labor conditions in the 
developing world.  As in Study 1 participants acknowledged that workers in the developing 
world suffer as a result of sweatshop labor conditions (M = 6.27, SD = .95; t(160) = 30.16, p  
< .001).  Participants also completed the 5-item behavioral survey used before to highlight 
participants‘ own culpability for harmful labor conditions.  As in Study 1 participants 
reported regular engagement in the behaviors purported to contribute to labor exploitation (M 
= 4.39, SD = .73; α = .81) was significantly higher than the scale‘s midpoint (4), t(160) = 
6.74, p < .001.   
Personal harm.  To address the potential that participants may feel personal anger 
over sweatshop labor practices participants completed a single face-valid item assessing the 
perception that they were personally harmed by exploitative labor practices (Rothschild & 
Keefer, 2017).  Specifically, participants rated their agreement with the following statement: 
―Sweatshop labor conditions have a direct negative effect on my life.‖ Responses were made 
on the same 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; M = 2.63, SD = 1.48) 
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Affirmation manipulation.  Next, participants completed a writing task purported to 
be a personality assessment.  This task was an affirmation manipulation used by previous 
research (Rothschild & Keefer, 2017; Rothschild et al., 2012).  Participants assigned to the 
moral identity affirmation condition responded to the following writing prompt: ―In a few 
sentences briefly describe something about yourself that makes you feel like a good and 
decent person.‖ Participants in the no affirmation condition responded to the following 
writing prompt: ―In a few sentences please briefly describe your normal morning routine.‖ 
An inspection of participants‘ written responses revealed that all participants wrote at least 
one sentence and no participants explicitly wrote about sweatshop labor. 
Moral outrage.  Finally, as in Study 1, participants read about Apple‘s exploitation of 
Chinese workers and completed the same 6-item moral outrage scale to assess anger at Apple 
for the unjust harm caused by their exploitative labor practices (M = 5.17, SD = 1.22; α = 
.96). 
Results 
 Zero-order correlations for all variables are presented in Table 6.  While JSO was 
positively associated with both moral outrage and JSV, no significant association emerged 
between the latter two variables (replicating past research; Rothmund et al., 2014).  
Furthermore, whereas perceived personal harm was positively related to outrage, it was not 
associated with either observer or victim justice sensitivity. 
Moral Outrage 
We regressed moral outrage onto affirmation manipulation (coded: moral identity 
affirmation = 1, no affirmation = 0), observer and victim justice sensitivity (both continuous 
and centered), and the justice sensitivity × affirmation interaction for each subscale.  We 
included personal harm as an additional continuous covariate.  Together these predictors 
accounted for significant variance in outrage, R
2
adj = .15, F(6, 154) = 5.75, p < .001 (see 
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Table 7 for effects with and without controlling for personal harm).  Importantly, whereas 
there was no evidence of either a main effect or interaction involving JSV, there were 
significant a main effects for both JSO and moral affirmation, which were qualified by the 
predicted JSO × Affirmation interaction (Figure 4).  This interaction accounted for a 
significant increase in R
2
, ΔR2 = .03, F(1, 154) = 5.63, p = .02. 
Consistent with predictions a simple slopes analysis revealed that in the moral 
affirmation condition, JSO was associated with greater outrage at corporate harm-doing, β = 
.55, b = 1.10, SE = .29, t = 3.76, p < 001.  In contrast, in the no affirmation condition, there 
was no significant association between JSO and outrage, β = .13, b = .26, SE = .20, t = 1.33, p 
= .19.  Also consistent with predictions, comparison of the low-JSO participants (-1 SD) 
demonstrated that those given the opportunity to affirm their moral identity (vs. no 
affirmation) showed reduced moral outrage β = -.37, b = -.89, SE = .27, t = -3.22, p =.002.  In 
contrast, among high-JSO participants (+1 SD) there was no significant difference in outrage 
between those who were and were not given the opportunity to affirm their own moral 
identity, β = .06, b = .13, SE = .28, t = 0.48, p = .64.   
Study 3 Discussion 
 Results of Study 3 show that the opportunity to affirm one‘s moral identity in an 
unrelated context reduced outrage at a third-party harm-doer among those low, but not high, 
in observer justice sensitivity.  Effects remained when statistically controlling for perceptions 
of personal harm.  These findings serve to both replicate previous research by showing the 
outrage-attenuating effect of a moral identity boost and extend this work by showing the 
moderating role of justice sensitivity.  Consistent with the results of Studies 1 and 2, these 
findings suggest that the outrage expressed by low (vs. high) observer-sensitive persons in 
particular, may be motivated by concerns about one‘s own moral identity rather than 
concerns about justice.   
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 Study 3 also found that observer justice sensitivity was only a significant predictor of 
moral outrage when participants had been given the opportunity to affirm their personal 
moral identity.  As with Studies 1 and 2, this finding highlights the salience of moral identity 
concerns as an important boundary condition influencing the relationship between justice 
sensitivity and moral outrage.   
 The fact that victim sensitivity was unrelated to outrage and that results held after 
controlling for perceived personal harm contradicts the view that our findings reflect 
variation in personal anger, rather than moral outrage.  The predicted null effects of victim 
sensitivity are also consistent with the idea that, unlike observer sensitivity, victim sensitivity 
reflects an egoistic concern with justice for the self, rather than a concern with justice more 
broadly. 
 Although Study 3‘s experimental design allows us to infer that moral identity 
concerns were a significant driving force behind expressions of outrage among low, but not 
high observer-sensitive persons, this observation requires replication on a more representative 
sample.  Furthermore, whereas the present research focuses on justice sensitivity, the bulk of 
the empirical literature on individual differences in justice-related concerns centers on inter-
individual differences in one‘s belief in a just world (Dalbert, 2009).  Research grounded in 
just world theory (Lerner, 1965, 1980) finds that people vary in their tendency to believe the 
world is a just place where one can reap rewards and avoid negative outcomes by abiding by 
basic rules and norms (Furnham, 2003).  As with justice sensitivity, the belief in a just world 
has been presented as an indicator of the strength of an individual‘s justice motive, or striving 
for justice as an end in itself (Dalbert, 2001; Schmitt, 1998).  It remains to be seen how 
assessments of justice sensitivity compare with just world beliefs in predicting whether or not 
expressions of outrage are likely to reflect a concern for one‘s own moral identity as opposed 
a concern for justice.   
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Study 4 
The first goal of Study 4 was to test the replicability of the observer-sensitivity × 
moral affirmation interaction found in Study 3 with a larger and more diverse sample of 
participants.  We did this by recruiting participants online rather than using a convenience 
sample of undergraduates.  We employed the same basic experimental paradigm used in 
Study 3, with some minor alterations described below. 
Another goal of Study 4 was to determine whether the moderation effect obtained in 
the previous study reflects a unique facet of justice sensitivity or a characteristic shared, or 
even better accounted for, by individual differences in just world beliefs.  Interestingly, 
although both constructs are presented as tapping inter-individual difference in one‘s justice 
motive, correlations between measures of justice sensitivity and belief in a just world tend to 
be quite low (e.g., -.04 to .18; Schmitt et al., 2013).  Furthermore, whereas justice sensitivity 
has been shown to predict outrage at another‘s victimization, beliefs in a just world have been 
shown to predict the derogation of innocent victims when compensation is not possible (e.g., 
Lerner & Simmons, 1966).  Reconciling these findings Baumert and colleagues (2013) 
suggest that whereas justice sensitivity may capture an unconditional concern for, and 
commitment to, justice as a universal moral principle, the belief in a just world primarily 
captures a conditional concern with justice rooted in a need to perceive the world as ordered.   
Justice sensitivity and belief in a just world differ in one critical way that we 
anticipated would lead the former, but not the latter, to moderate the relationship between the 
affirmation and outrage. Justice sensitivity primarily reflects a genuine concern with 
rectifying injustice while the belief in a just world reflects a motive to see the world as just, 
regardless of whether that perception is achieved by actual change or merely a legitimization 
of some outcome (e.g., blaming the victim). Accordingly, we predicted that individual 
differences in observer sensitivity, but not the belief in a just world, would predict third-
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party-directed outrage at labor exploitation.  Furthermore, we predicted that differences in 
observer sensitivity, but not the belief in a just world, would moderate the moral affirmation-
induced attenuation of outrage at a corporate harm-doer.  We also predicted parallel effects 
on support for punishing third-party harm-doing.   
Finally, given that political beliefs have been shown to influence attitudes about the 
redress of corporate injustice (e.g. Kardos, Leidner, Zsolnai, & Castano, 2016), we measured 
and controlled for self-reported political orientation in Study 4 to ensure that the predicted 
effects were not due to variations in political ideology.   
Method 
Four-hundred and sixty-four American adults were recruited to participate through 
Amazon‘s Mturk service for $.60. 6 Data from 54 cases were removed from the dataset prior 
to analyses based on previous a priori exclusion criteria: failing an attention check (42 
participants), and/or spending less than 10 seconds viewing the first article on sweatshop 
labor (24 participants).  The remaining 410 participants (264 women, 140 men, 6 
unidentified) ranged in age from 18 to 67 years (M = 32.10, SD = 10.07).  The average self-
reported political orientation (1 = very conservative, 4 = moderate, 7 = very liberal) of our 
sample skewed slightly liberal (M = 4.52, SD = 1.59).  Over 63% of participants reported 
owning a product made by Apple. Study 4 used the same materials as Study 3 with the 
exception of assessing general belief in a just world in place of victim justice sensitivity, 
recording political orientation and including retributive punishment of third-party harm-doing 
as another dependent measure. 
Materials and Procedure 
Observer justice sensitivity.  Participants completed the same 10-item JSO scale used 
in the previous studies (M = 4.19, SD = .77; α = .87). 
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Belief in a just word.  Participants also completed the 6-item General Belief in Just 
World (BJW) scale designed to measure individuals‘ belief that the world in general is a just 
place (Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987).  Specifically, participants indicated their 
agreement/disagreement with statements describing the world as a place in which justice 
prevails (e.g., ―I think the world is a just place‖; ―I am confident that, by and large, people get 
what they deserve‖).  Responses were made on a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = 
strongly agree) and were averaged to form composite scores (M = 3.23, SD = .84; α = .78). 
Personal culpability induction.  As in the previous studies, participants were then 
exposed to an article about sweatshop labor conditions in the developing world and 
completed a short survey meant to highlight their own culpability.  Participants both 
acknowledged that workers were suffering under sweatshop workers (M = 6.46, SD = .86; 
t(409) = 57.95, p  < .001) and reported engaging in the behaviors purported to contribute to 
labor exploitation (M = 4.33, SD = .82; t(409) = 8.09, p < .001). 
Affirmation manipulation.  Participants then completed the same writing task used 
in Study 3 and were randomly assigned to either the moral identity affirmation or no 
affirmation condition.  As in Study 3, participants‘ written responses revealed that all 
participants wrote at least one sentence. 
Moral outrage and support for retributive punishment.  As in the previous 
studies, participants read the article detailing Apple‘s Inc.‘s exploitation of those working in 
their Chinese factories, and indicated their anger and support for punishing Apple Inc. for its 
harmful sweatshop practices using the aforementioned moral outrage scale (M = 5.35, SD = 
1.56; α = .98) and retributive punishment scale (M = 5.55, SD = 1.39; α = .95) 
Results 
 Zero-order correlations are presented in Table 8.  JSO was positively associated with 
both outrage and support for punishing a third-party harm-doer.  In contrast BJW was 
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negatively related to both JSO and retributive punishment, and had no significant association 
with outrage.  Political orientation scores were associated with all other variables, although 
notably showed diverging associations with JSO (which skewed liberal) and BJW (which 
skewed conservative).       
Moral Outrage 
We regressed moral outrage onto affirmation manipulation (coded: moral identity 
affirmation = 1, no affirmation = 0), observer justice sensitivity and belief in a just world 
(both continuous and centered) along with the key two-way interactions (JSO × affirmation 
and BJW × affirmation).  We included political orientation as an additional continuous and 
centered covariate.  Together these predictors accounted for a significant amount of variance 
in moral outrage, R
2
adj = .18, F(6, 403) = 15.73, p < .001 (see Table 9 for all effects with and 
without controlling for political orientation).  Importantly, whereas there was no evidence of 
either a main effect or interaction involving just world beliefs, there was a significant a main 
effect for observer justice sensitivity that was qualified by the predicted JSO × Affirmation 
interaction (Figure 5).  This significant interaction accounted for a significant increase in R
2
, 
ΔR2 = .02, ΔF(1, 403) = 7.83, p = .01. 
Consistent with predictions, a simple slopes analysis revealed that in the moral 
affirmation condition, JSO was positively associated with outrage at corporate harm-doing, β 
= .48, b = .98, SE = .13, t = 7.37, p < 001.  JSO was also a significant predictor of expressed 
outrage in the no affirmation condition, β = .22, b = .46, SE = .13, t = 3.44, p = .001.  Also 
consistent with predictions, comparison of the low-JSO participants demonstrated that those 
given the opportunity to affirm their moral identity (vs. no affirmation) showed reduced 
moral outrage β = -.20, b = -.64, SE = .20, t = -3.20, p = .002.  In contrast, among high-JSO 
participants there was no significant difference in outrage between those who were and were 
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not given the opportunity to affirm their own moral identity, β = .05, b = .17, SE = .20, t = 
0.84, p = .40.   
Retributive Punishment 
We regressed support for retributive punishment onto the same predictors.  Together 
these predictors accounted for significant variance in support for retributive punishment, R
2
adj 
= .18, F(6, 403) = 16.29, p < .001 (see Table 10 for effects with and without controlling for 
political orientation).  Importantly, whereas there was no evidence of either a main effect or 
interaction involving BJW, there was a significant a main effect for JSO that was qualified by 
the predicted JSO × Affirmation interaction (see Figure 6).  This interaction accounted for a 
significant increase in R
2
, ΔR2 = .01, F(1, 403) = 5.23, p = .02. 
Consistent with predictions a simple slopes analysis revealed that in the moral 
affirmation condition, JSO was associated with greater retributive punishment, β = .39, b = 
.71, SE = .12, t = 6.05, p < 001.  JSO was also a significant predictor of punitiveness in the no 
affirmation condition, β = .18, b = .33, SE = .12, t = 2.84, p < .01.  Consistent with 
predictions, comparison of the low-JSO participants (-1 SD) demonstrated that those given the 
opportunity to affirm their moral identity (vs. no affirmation) showed reduced punitiveness β 
= -.18, b = -.48, SE = .18, t = -2.68, p = .01.  In contrast, among high- JSO participants (+1 
SD) a moral affirmation did not yield an appreciable effect, β = .04, b = .10, SE = .18, t = 
0.57, p = .57.   
Study 4 Discussion 
 As in Study 3, Study 4 found that low, but not high observer-sensitive people express 
less outrage and support for punishing at a third-party harm-doer when they are given the 
opportunity to affirm their own personal morality in an unrelated context.  This pattern of 
effects remained when statistically controlling for differences in political ideology.  By 
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replicating the primary results of Study 3 on a larger sample, these findings bolster our 
confidence that differences in justice sensitivity moderate expressions of defensive outrage.   
One discrepancy between Study 4 and Study 3 was the fact that justice sensitivity was 
a significant predictor of outrage in both the affirmation and no affirmation condition, 
although the effect was greater in the former.  This difference may be the result of Study 4‘s 
larger sample size.  More broadly, these results are consistent with the previous studies in 
highlighting the interplay between personality and relevant situational factors.   
Importantly, in contrast to justice sensitivity, Study 4 found that individual differences 
in the belief in a just world did not moderate the effects of moral affirmation on either 
outrage or retributive punishment.  In concert with the previous studies, these findings 
highlight observer justice sensitivity as a unique moderator of defensive outrage at third-party 
harm-doing.  Belief in a just world was uncorrelated with outrage and negatively associated 
with both support for punishing third-party harm-doing and justice sensitivity.  These 
findings are consistent with Baumert et al. (2013)‘s claim that unlike justice sensitivity, the 
belief in a just world may not reflect variations in one‘s genuine unconditional concern with 
justice.      
General Discussion 
Four studies supported the claim that individual differences in observer justice 
sensitivity moderates the extent to which expressions of outrage reflect concerns about one‘s 
own moral identity rather than concerns with justice per se.  Studies 1 and 2 found that, 
compared to those high in observer sensitivity, low observer-sensitive participants‘ moral 
outrage and support for retributive punishment were strongly predicted by guilt.  Using an 
experimental paradigm, Studies 3 and 4 found that the chance to affirm one‘s personal moral 
status reduced such expressions of third-party-directed outrage and punitiveness among those 
low, but not high in observer sensitivity.  In other words, while observer-sensitive 
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participants expressed outrage regardless of their current moral standing (overall r = .05, p = 
.44), those low in observer justice sensitivity showed elevated outrage when they felt guilt or 
otherwise lacked a moral affirmation (overall r = .38, p < .0001; for full meta-analysis see 
Appendix A).  
Supporting the specificity of the obtained observer-sensitivity effects in the context of 
third-party-directed outrage there was no evidence of moderation by perpetrator sensitivity, 
beneficiary sensitivity (Study 2), victim sensitivity (Study 3), or just world beliefs (Study 4).  
We took steps to acknowledge alternative explanations by measuring and controlling for 
extraneous variables.  For instance, controlling for general negative affect in Study 1 we 
showed that the association between guilt and moral outrage among those low but not high in 
observer justice sensitivity was not reducible to variation in general negative affect.  We also 
sought to ensure that the obtained effects reflected variations in moral outrage as opposed to 
empathic or personal anger.  We did this by covarying out the extent to which participants 
empathized with the workers harmed by the corporation‘s sweatshop labor practices (Study 
1) and the extent to which participants felt personally harmed by those practices (Study 3).  
Given the potentially political nature of the issues at hands we also controlled for self-
reported political ideology to no effect.   
Contribution to previous literatures 
 Previous research presents compelling evidence that outrage in the name of justice 
can reflect a motivated effort to alleviate guilt and bolster a moral self-image (Rothschild & 
Keefer, 2017; Rothschild et al., 2013).  However, whereas past research focused on 
understanding when defensive expressions of outrage are likely to occur, the present studies 
provide initial evidence concerning who is likely to do so.  Our findings identify important 
boundary conditions for the phenomenon of defensive outrage and show that outrage is not 
always defensive: Participants high in observer justice sensitivity expressed outrage 
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regardless of their current feelings of guilt or moral superiority.  More broadly these studies 
illustrate how research investigating responses to situational threats can benefit from 
considering the moderating role of personality.   
 The present research also makes significant contributions to the literature on justice 
sensitivity.  Observer (as well as perpetrator and beneficiary) justice sensitivity is 
conceptualized as reflecting stable differences in a person‘s concern with, and motivation to 
uphold justice as a universal moral principle.  As evidence of this point, researchers have 
linked observer justice sensitivity with moral outrage and a desire to punish third-party 
violators, even at a cost to the self (Fetchenhauer & Huang, 2004; Lotz et al., 2011).  
However, the fact that outrage can sometimes serve to bolster a sense of one‘s moral status 
means that the effects of observer sensitivity are not so straightforward.  The present research 
provides greater clarity by assessing not only the quantity of outrage expressed, by also 
indirectly assessing the motivation behind this outrage.  Consistent with the assumption that 
observer justice sensitivity reflects a ―genuine‖ concern with justice (Baumert et al. 2013), 
we found that the expressions of outrage among high (vs low) observer-sensitive persons‘ 
were largely independent of measured and manipulated personal moral status.   
 Although Studies 2 and 3 found associations between observer- and the other justice 
sensitivity scales, the specificity of the primary interactions support the conceptual and 
contextual distinctiveness of observer sensitivity.  Study 4 went further to differentiate justice 
sensitivity from the belief in a just world, a preeminent example of a core justice motive 
(Hafer & Sutton, 2016).  Although presented as a concern with justice, previous research has 
shown that a strong belief in a just world does not always predict reactions to injustice 
(Callan, Kay, Davidenko, & Ellard, 2009; Ellard, Harvey, & Callan, 2016).  Consistent with 
this literature we found just world beliefs to be unrelated to outrage and negatively associated 
with third-party punishment.  We also found just world beliefs to be inversely related to 
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observer sensitivity.  Taken together these findings suggest that whereas justice sensitivity 
may capture a readiness to see injustice in order to right any wrongs, the belief in a just world 
captures a tendency to deny injustice in order to maintain the illusion of justice.   
Limitations and future directions 
Importantly, whereas the present studies provide consistent evidence that outrage 
among high (vs low) observer-sensitive persons is largely independent of concerns with one‘s 
own moral status, we cannot definitely claim that this outrage primarily reflects a ―genuine‖ 
concern for justice.  For instance, it‘s possible that those high in justice sensitivity were 
tailoring their responses in accordance with prescriptive norms of moral behavior.  Research 
shows that those high in justice sensitivity are more likely to see ‗being moral‘ as a central 
aspect of their self-concept (Rothmund, Männel, & Altzschner, 2012).  Given that people are 
motivated to behave in ways that are consistent with their identity (Emde, Biringen, Clyman, 
& Oppenheim, 1991), this raises the possibility that high justice-sensitive persons may 
express moral outrage because they believe that they (as moral people) ought to be outraged. 
Unfortunately, self-report measures are notoriously vulnerable to social desirability 
and self-deception.  As such, we are limited in our ability to determine whether expressions 
of outrage reflect a genuine emotional experience or the expectation that one ought to 
respond as such.  One way for future research to overcome this limitation would be to employ 
measures that are less amenable to conscious deliberation.  For instance, Johnston, Sherman 
and Grusec (2013) measured moral outrage by assessing heart rate and diastolic blood 
pressure in response to moral violations.  Interestingly, Johnston and colleagues found these 
physiological markers of outrage were predicted by implicit, but not explicit measures of 
moral identity.  Building on this approach, future research may consider whether implicit 
measures of justice sensitivity may better predict spontaneous, real-world expressions of 
outrage. 
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 The context of the present studies focuses on a real-world problem that draws 
consumers, corporations, and workers together in a complicated web.  Because of this 
symbiotic relationship, it is possible that at least some participants may have explicitly 
viewed themselves and the corporate harm-doer as part of a larger system perpetuating 
injustice.  In part our studies leveraged this fact to instill feelings of personal guilt through the 
consumer behavior questionnaire.  This raises the possibility that our measure of outrage at 
corporate harm-doing may have captured feelings of ingroup anger, rather than outgroup-
directed outrage.  Importantly, two key pieces of evidence suggest that our primary findings 
are not reducible to variations in ingroup anger.  First, we assessed whether or not 
participants owned Apple products in Studies 2 through 4 as a proxy for whether or not Apple 
might be seen as an ingroup.  Analyses found that the observed effects were unchanged when 
statistically controlling for Apple ownership and none of the primary interactions were 
moderated by Apple ownership.  Second, Study 2 found that even with perpetrator sensitivity 
included in the model, observer sensitivity uniquely predicted outrage and punitiveness, and 
it was observer, not perpetrator sensitivity that served as a significant moderator.  Future 
research could further differentiate ingroup and out-group-directed outrage by explicitly 
assessing identification with a third-party harm-doer or manipulating the ingroup/outgroup 
designation of a potential third-party target (e.g., exploited foreign laborers vs. exploited 
American consumers).    
 We made a conscious decision to adopt methods used by previous research and keep 
materials largely consistent across studies to test the replicability of our findings. While such 
efforts were taken in an effort to maximize internal validity and bolster confidence in our 
effects, the decision to examine effects in a specific context and use uniform study materials 
has the downside of limiting the external validity of this research.  
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 Furthermore, our choice to focus on the influence of observer sensitivity on outrage 
expressed under a specific set of conditions (i.e., salient personal or collective harm-doing 
paired with exposure to a third-party perpetrating the same harm) limits our ability to draw 
conclusions about the potential boundary conditions for these effects. Because we relied on 
designs that exposed all participants to a specific moral threat in order to test the moderating 
role of justice sensitivity; we cannot speak to the nuanced relations between justice sensitivity 
and outrage under other circumstances (e.g., in the absence of threat).  
 Would the obtained interaction extend to contexts beyond sweatshop labor? For 
example, if the topic were something more benign (e.g., a parking violation), observer 
sensitivity may not moderate expressions of outrage solely given the lower stakes. There is 
seemingly no limit to the diversity of things that inspire outrage, so the breadth of the 
phenomenon calls for further study. 
 By focusing on sweatshop labor, we also limited the topic to a domain in which 
participants bear some personal culpability as consumers. What if one‘s immorality is 
unrelated to third-party harm-doing? For instance, if an individual were informed of a 
previously unknown war crime in a distant country, we might see similar effects to the extent 
that highly observer sensitive participants would still be expected to express outrage, but this 
is unclear.  
 In addition to limiting our scope to a domain in which participants bear personal 
accountability, we also focused on a scenario in which the harm-doing was perpetrated at the 
group level. We cannot speak to the potential outcome of a scenario in which the harm-doing 
is perpetrated solely by the perceiver (without the complicity of corporations and global 
capitalism). If an individual were reminded of personal misdeeds, they may still show 
reactive expressions of outrage of unrelated parties to bolster their own moral status, but our 
data did not explore outrage in that context. Ultimately, gauging the potential real world 
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relevance of the present work hinges on future efforts to exploring such questions using 
different methodologies to assess the generalizability of our effects across contexts. 
Conclusion 
The current series of studies integrates literature on the defensive uses of moral 
outrage with insights on a critical individual difference that moderates this process. By 
shedding light on this variation by personality, we further illustrate how truly complex moral 
outrage can be: In some situations and for some people, it serves to assuage doubts about 
one‘s own morality. For other situations and individuals, outrage seems to represent a 
genuine motive to right a wrong and improve the world. Recognizing this variation calls not 
for a reductionistic view of outrage as mere theater or authentic concern, but rather for a 
greater appreciation of the many psychological functions of moral outrage.  
 
Appendix A: Meta-analytic summary of current studies 
Table 1. 
Meta-analytic summary of effect of threatened moral status on observed outcomes. 
 r [95% CI] Z p 
Low (-1 SD) JSo .38 [.21, .54] 4.44 < .0001 
High (+1 SD) JSo .05 [-.08, .18] 0.76 .44 
 
Note. Effects of affirmation in Studies 3 and 4 have been reverse-scored to put all effects on 
the same metric. Summary translated all standardized beta‘s in r (Peterson & Brown, 2005) 
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Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. 
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Footnotes 
 1
 We conducted power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 
2009) for all studies. This revealed that a total sample of 150 for Study 1 would be necessary 
to ensure .80 power to detect a small to moderate effect for our predicted interaction. 
 2
 For each study all measured and manipulated variables are presented. All data are 
available from the corresponding author upon request. 
 3 
In an effort to ensure .80 power, assuming comparable effects as Study 1, we sought 
a total sample of 247.  Factoring in the exclusion rate from Study 1 (10%), we estimated that 
we would need to collect approximately 275 participants. 
 4
 Studies 2-4 found that Apple product ownership had no appreciable effect on the 
predicted interactions when entered as an additional covariate, nor did this variable moderate 
the obtained two-way interactions. We excluded these analyses for ease of presentation. 
 
 5
 In an effort to ensure .80 power, assuming a small to medium effect, we sought a 
total sample of 177. Factoring in the exclusion rate from Studies 1 (10%) and 2 (11%) we 
estimated that we would need to collect approximately 200 participants. 
 6
 In an effort to ensure .80 power, assuming comparable effects as Study 3, we sought 
a total sample of 373.  Factoring in the exclusion rate from Study 3 (19%) we estimated that 
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Table 7.  Estimated parameters for model predicted moral outrage with and without 
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Table 9.  Estimated parameters for model predicted moral outrage with and without 











































   -.01 
 





































































* p < .05 
** p < .01 











This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
Table 10.  Estimated parameters for model predicted retributive punishment with and 
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Figure 1.  Effect of observer justice sensitivity and personal guilt on moral outrage at a 
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Figure 2.  Effect of observer justice sensitivity and personal guilt on moral outrage at a 
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Figure 3.  Effect of observer justice sensitivity and personal guilt on support for punishing 
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Figure 4.  Effect of observer justice sensitivity and moral identity affirmation on moral 
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Figure 5.  Effect of observer justice sensitivity and moral identity affirmation on moral 
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Figure 6.  Effect of observer justice sensitivity and moral identity affirmation on support for 
punishing corporations for sweatshop labor practices controlling for political orientation 
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